Safety Complaceny

                               
Pictures and a news story recently crossed my feed. ABC News reported multiple fatalities when two small planes somehow collided in rural California. I have spent a few hours in cockpits over the years, and have known a great many excellent pilots. My first thought reading the article was the tragedy the event represents for various families and friends connected to the victims. But, my thoughts soon turned to safety and complacency.
 
An investigation will ensue, that is normal in such instances. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FAA, and even local authorities will likely be involved. Aircraft collisions are rare, and so the cause will be sought with perhaps more energy than can be devoted to other mishaps, near misses, etc. Notably, the pictures with the story represent clear weather. Of course weather is transitory and there is the chance it played some role and then cleared before the pictures were taken. Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes is credited with cautioning that
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.”
That will be the investigators' role, identifying and documenting those facts. What is known so far is that the two planes were at an "uncontrolled field." This means that there was no tower controller providing radio instructions. One plane "was operating in the traffic pattern, and the other was coming in to land" when the two collided and crashed. They were markedly disparate aircraft.
 
One was a Cessna 152, a simple, light, and forgiving aircraft. It seats two, has a gross horsepower of 110, a maximum airspeed of 149 knots indicated, and a maximum altitude under 15,000 feet (according to AOPA). The other was a Cessna 340, a more complex plane. The 340 is a twin-engine, pressurized craft capable of altitudes far above the 152. It carries up to five passengers and cruises at 200 knots, with "a typical cruising altitude . . . around 18,000-21,000" feet (according to disciples of flight).
 
The reader may know already that "in the traffic pattern" can mean various locations around an airfield. Being "in the pattern" means flying around an airport's runway. That may be in preparation for a landing, or often it is just a good practice for future landings. The specifics of the pattern are usually defined for each field. Of course, when there is a control tower, you do as instructed. When there is not, you habitually fly a pattern like this and watch for other traffic. It is a landing ritual. The incident in this matter occurred, essentially, as one driver was circling the block as another driver was attempting to drive into an exit from the street/pattern. 
 
The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) says that half of all airfield collisions occur on the final approach leg of the pattern (Final 34%; Short Final 16%). Another 34% occur on the runway itself. Therefore, collision in the rest of the pattern is reasonably rare. Collisions away from the airport is also very rare, only about 30 instances each year, according to the Air Force. But, the worst in history was far from the field, and was eventually blamed on the system, rather than those who controlled the planes.
 
In the broad perspective, however, Boeing reports that about 80% of aircraft losses are due to human error. It concedes that this includes all of the humans ("pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics, etc."). That has changed dramatically over the last century. In the early days of aviation, the mechanical failure percentage was 80% and human error only 20%. Have humans become more fallible in the last 120 years? Have planes become safer? Have those two evolutions combined for this juxtaposition? In fairness, the NTSA says that an even higher percentage of auto accidents, 93%, include elements of human error. 
 
The particular air collision in the recent article occurred in the afternoon. As noted, there is no mention of weather challenges or of either pilot declaring an emergency of some kind. Most aircraft are equipped with at least rudimentary radios, and so anyone in an emergency is likely to notify those in the area. Of course, even radios could fail (pilots therefore often install multiple radios). Even with multiple radios, a systemic electrical failure might render all radios in a plane inoperable. Thus, there is little known for certain. But, something happened above this California field recently, and people died. 
 
Someone once coined the phrase
“Remember there are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but there are no old bold pilots."
The originator of that is not clear. I always thought it was Chuck Yeager, but it is likely that was merely the first time I heard or acknowledged it. The point is that aircraft operations can be dangerous. Those who wish to avoid tragedy or injury must practice extreme caution. There is little room for bold maneuvers, chance taking, or additional risk. And, reflecting on that, it seems the same is true for much of our lives. When driving a car, walking on a roof, climbing scaffold, etc. All around us, daily, people are in harm's way. They may be able to rely on technology (which might fail). They may in some instances have the luxury of some direction (like the tower controller or managers). But, in many instances it will be just the worker and her or his own safety focus. 
 
I was recently asked during a panel presentation why workers' compensation frequency (the rate of injury occurring) has been so persistently decreasing for decades. The fact is that our national focus on workplace safety really only began in the Nixon Administration in 1972. Furthermore, our lives have become overladen with safety devices in recent decades. Remember that the automobile airbag was a novelty in 1972, driver's side only, and very expensive. Now there are models with ten or more airbags. We have witnessed much evolution in safety devices, automation, and more that helps to protect us from ourselves. And yet, people do still get hurt. 
 
Complacency. That is perhaps the real risk. It is a human condition, reaction, and risk. We make hundreds of automobile trips, production cycles, or aircraft landings, and we become comfortable. That the car has safety devices cannot relieve us of our caution and care. Too often, perhaps we become complacent. And, that is a risk that may have grave consequences. We may lose our sense or the surroundings, and fail to protect ourselves. We may likewise forget safety and fail to protect others. 
 
A British tourist was recently on a tour in Greece and also suffered an aircraft tragedy. He disembarked a helicopter charter as we have seen so many do in films. The rotors were still in motion, including the tail rotor. Some outlets reported that he turned back toward the craft to take a selfie. Others contend that this is "rubbish." And, perhaps we will never know why he returned toward the craft. What we know is that he contacted the spinning tail rotor well behind the passenger compartment. Those rotors are spinning fast (some say the blade tips spin at over six hundred feet per second). This tourist was struck in the head and killed. 
 
In both tragedies, we see the same potential for some failure of safety measures. Was there complacency on the part of those killed? Was there complacency on the part of those responsible for their safety (who allowed the charter helicopter passengers to disembark before all the rotors had wound down?). Who was keeping an eye out  for other traffic at the uncontrolled airfield in California? Complacency? Inattention? Time will tell as investigations proceed. 
 
Should the tour helicopter company have made the disembark less convenient by stopping the engine, and thus the rotation of the various blades, before opening the cabin door? Time would have been consumed that is avoided with the practice of boarding with the engine running. But is that time worth the risk of harm? Was the passenger instructed to stay away from the spinning rotors? Do we really need to be told? (In fairness, we seem to all need reminders about safety, that is why the car beeps at us until we buckle up).
 

 

In a broad context, we should be pleased that the workers' compensation community continues to focus on safety. The fact is that any workplace can present danger and each occupation can likely be made safer. Even if the only improvement we might make to an environment is our own awareness of safety. Awareness and reminder alone can make us all safer. We owe it to our coworkers, fellow passengers, and community. More so, we owe it to ourselves. These two recent air disasters remind us that amateurs and professionals can make mistakes, that momentary inattention can be disastrous, and that complacency may be our worst enemy.
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    About The Author

    • Judge David Langham

      David Langham is the Deputy Chief Judge of Compensation Claims for the Florida Office of Judges of Compensation Claims at the Division of Administrative Hearings. He has been involved in workers’ compensation for over 25 years as an attorney, an adjudicator, and administrator. He has delivered hundreds of professional lectures, published numerous articles on workers’ compensation in a variety of publications, and is a frequent blogger on Florida Workers’ Compensation Adjudication. David is a founding director of the National Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary and the Professional Mediation Institute, and is involved in the Southern Association of Workers’ Compensation Administrators (SAWCA) and the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions (IAIABC). He is a vocal advocate of leveraging technology and modernizing the dispute resolution processes of workers’ compensation.